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Abstract
There exists a growing literature on the so-called physical Church-
Turing thesis in a relativistic spacetime setting. The physical Church-
Turing thesis is the conjecture that no computing device that is phys-
ically realizable (even in principle) can exceed the computational bar-
riers of a Turing machine. By suggesting a concrete implementation
of a beyond-Turing computer in a spacetime setting, Istva´n Ne´meti
and Gyula Da´vid (2006) have shown how an appreciation of the phys-
ical Church-Turing thesis necessitates the confluence of mathematical,
computational, physical, and indeed cosmological ideas. In this essay,
I will honour Istva´n’s seventieth birthday, as well as his longstanding
interest in, and his seminal contributions to, this field going back to as
early as 1987 by modestly proposing how the concrete implementation
in Ne´meti and Da´vid (2006) might be complemented by a quantum-
information-theoretic communication protocol between the computing
device and the logician who sets the beyond-Turing computer a task
such as determining the consistency of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory.
This suggests that even the foundations of quantum theory and, ulti-
mately, quantum gravity may play an important role in determining
the validity of the physical Church-Turing thesis.
Keywords: hypercomputation, relativistic computers, Malament-Hogarth
spacetimes, timelike entanglement
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To Istva´n Ne´meti on the occasion of his 70th birthday
The physical Church-Turing thesis, as I will understand it, asserts that no
computing device that is physically realizable (even in principle) can exceed
the computational barriers of a Turing machine. It is not to be confused
with the logically independent Church-Turing thesis, according to which a
function is ‘effectively’, or ‘algorithmically’ computable just in case it is
computable by a Turing machine.1 This essay will be concerned with the
physical realizability rather than with issues in the foundations of compu-
tation theory.
There are at least two ways in which the locution ‘physically realizable’
can be fleshed out. First, it may mean that an idealized device is realiz-
able or implementable in the context of a specific physical theory. In the
present setting, one such specific theory would be general relativity. Alter-
natively, it may mean that an idealized device is realizable or implementable
as judged by all our fundamental theories, or our current best candidates for
such theories, or a carefully balanced combination of our current best candi-
dates. Thus, unlike the Church-Turing thesis, or Goldbach’s conjecture, the
physical Church-Turing thesis is not just a hypothesis in pure mathematics,
but crucially involves physics. What kind of physics it involves depends on
how we contextualize ‘physically realizable’. After a very brief history of
relativistic computing in §1, we will start in §2 by confining ourselves to
general relativity. In §3, the purview of our considerations will be extended
to include quantum physics. The conclusions follow in §4.
At the first pass, the question thus arises as to whether general relativity
permits, at least in principle, a scenario in which ‘hyper-Turing’ computa-
tions, i.e., computations not executable by Turing machines, are possible.
The main thesis of Etesi and Ne´meti (2002), and repeated in Ne´meti and
Da´vid (2006), holds that “it is consistent with Einstein’s equations, i.e. with
general relativity, that by certain kinds of relativistic experiments, future
generations might find the answer to non-computable questions like the halt-
ing problem of Turing machines or the consistency of Zermelo Fraenkel set
theory” (Ne´meti and Da´vid 2006, 119) and hence that the physical Church-
Turing thesis is false, at least in the context of general relativity. The goal of
the present essay is to make modest progress in spinning some open threads
of this literature a bit further.
1And hence, the argument presented in this essay is not touched by the complaints by
Shagrir and Pitowsky (2003, 94).
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1 A brief history of relativistic computers
Before I delve into the details of the physical implementation of a device
that could realize a beyond-Turing computer, let me briefly recount some
of the history behind the leading ideas of this literature.2 So as we cel-
ebrate Istva´n’s 70th birthday in 2012, we can equally hail the 25th an-
niversary of relativistic computers. As extant lecture notes prove, Istva´n
Ne´meti’s 1987 PhD seminar entitled ‘On logic, relativity, and the limita-
tions of human knowledge’ at Iowa State University first articulates the idea
of a relativistic computer as it will essentially be given in Definition 2 be-
low. Shortly thereafter, in 1988, David Malament privately communicates
the idea of what we will call a ‘Malament-Hogarth spacetime’ below in Def-
inition 1 to John Earman. In 1990, Itamar Pitowsky develops the related
idea of what was coined in Earman and Norton (1993)—another seminal
early contribution—‘Pitowsky spacetime’ (Pitowsky 1990). Recognizing the
significance of Malament’s general ideas about requisite spacetime struc-
tures, Mark Hogarth generalizes them and applies them to computability
theory (Hogarth 1992). While the succession of novel contributions to the
literature remains rapid today, these early ideas collectively establish the
field of relativistic computers within five years of its inception.
2 AMalament-Hogarth spacetime: Kerr-Newman
Any assessment of the physical Church-Turing thesis will thus depend, at
least in part, on physical possibility as legislated by physical theories. Clearly,
such an evaluation must be grounded in the best available physical theories
for it to claim any validity. Potentially, this includes distinct and quite dif-
ferent theories. First, as is recognized by many, general relativity (GR), as
our best spacetime theory to date, offers novel and sometimes surprising spa-
tiotemporal settings for computations, and may thus permit beyond-Turing
computers. To elaborate how this possibility arises is the goal of this section.
Before we embark, however, let me emphasize that other physical theories
may well be considered in this context; after all, a computational device will
presumably be built from material components, and GR tells us nothing
about most of the properties of matter and of energy. Thus, it wouldn’t be
all that surprising if some quantum theory or other became relevant. In fact,
as we shall see in §3, quantum theories take centre stage in my attempts to
codify a communication protocol between the computer and its programmer.
2Cf. also Ne´meti and Da´vid (2006, §3).
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Finally, it should be noted that we must reasonably expect that many of the
issues we will encounter will only find a final resolution in a full quantum
theory of gravity. In the absence of such a theory, however, let us proceed
for now with the best available (classical) spacetime theory—GR.
A model in GR is a triple 〈M, gab, Tab〉 such that the Einstein field equa-
tions are satisfied, where M is a four-dimensional Lorentzian manifold, gab
the metric tensor, and Tab the energy-momentum tensor. An ordered pair
〈M, gab〉 such that there exists a Tab for which the triple 〈M, gab, Tab〉 is a
model of GR is called a relativistic spacetime. As it turns out, there are
relativistic spacetimes which permit the implementation of a beyond-Turing
computer. In GR, physical clocks ‘deeper’ in a gravitational well, i.e., at
spacetime locations with stronger gravitational fields, run more slowly than
their initially synchronized counterparts ‘higher up’ in the gravitational field.
This differential in field strength can now be used to achieve a computa-
tional speed-up. In fact, as there is no upper bound on the gravitational
field strength in GR, the achievable speed-up is also beyond any bounds.
In order to obtain beyond-Turing computation, the gravitational field
must be such that the computer can run an infinite number of computations
in the causal past of some spacetime event the programmer can reach within
finite time. It is essential to appreciate the fact that this hypercomputational
design does not presume an intrinsic speed-up of the computer; in particular,
it does not rely on the feasibility of a ‘supertask’, at least not if this locution
is taken to imply the possibility of the performance or operation of an infinite
number of tasks within a finite amount of proper time of the device which
does the computing. Instead, what relativistic hypercomputation relies on
is the existence of a worldline γ—the computer’s worldline—with infinite
proper length, ∫
γ
ds =∞,
which completely remains in the causal past of an event which can be reached
by the programmer in finite proper time along her worldline. Relativistic
spacetimes in which such a worldline exists are called Malament-Hogarth
spacetimes:
Definition 1. A relativistic spacetime 〈M, gab〉 is a Malament-Hogarth
spacetime just in case there is a future-directed timelike half-curve γ : R+ →
M such that ∫γ ds =∞ and there exists a point q ∈M (the MH event) sat-
isfying imγ ⊂ J−(q), where J−(q) is the causal past of q.
The salient aspect of a Malament-Hogarth spacetime is illustrated in
Figure 1, where the entirety of the curve γ is confined to the causal past
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Figure 1: A Malament-Hogarth spacetime with the region J−(q) shaded in
blue.
J−(q) of an event q on the worldline γp of a programmer. The computer’s
worldline γ and the programmer’s worldline γp part ways at p. A certain
kind of determinism fails in Malament-Hogarth spacetimes, as they are not
globally hyperbolic and thus do not admit a Cauchy surface.3 It is straight-
forward to see that this must be the case. A globally hyperbolic spacetime
can be foliated by totally ordered Cauchy surfaces such that the topology
of the spacetime manifold is R× Σ, where Σ denotes any Cauchy surface.4
If a Malament-Hogarth spacetime were globally hyperbolic, the Malament-
Hogarth event q would thus be contained in some Cauchy surface. Thus,
every inextendible timelike curve would have to intersect it. But this is
clearly impossible for the half curve γ, which cannot be extended to leave
the causal past of q. Thus, Malament-Hogarth spacetimes are not globally
hyperbolic.
A Malament-Hogarth spacetime is required to built a ‘relativistic com-
puter’, i.e., a hypercomputational device or set-up of devices, which relies on
the spacetime structure of a relativistic spacetime to achieve beyond-Turing
computation, rather than on an intrinsic speed-up. Following Ne´meti and
Da´vid (2006, Def. 4.5), we define a relativistic computer quite abstractly as
3A Cauchy surface is a spacelike hypersurface Σ such that every timelike or null curve
without endpoints intersects Σ exactly once.
4Wald (1984), Theorem 8.3.14.
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follows:
Definition 2 (Relativistic computer). A relativistic computer in a Malament-
Hogarth spacetime 〈M, gab〉 is a triple 〈γp, γ, q〉 such that γ is an upward-
infinite future-directed curve fully in J−(q) of some event q ∈ M, γp is a
timelike curve such that q lies on it and an initial segment of γp coincides
with γ (up to, say, point p).
Such a device should surely qualify as a hypercomputational device, as
there is a clear sense in which the programmer will, in principle, be able to
witness the computer perform an infinity of tasks within a finite amount of
the programmer’s own proper time. Since we are interested in the physi-
cal Church-Turing thesis, the questions before us are (i) whether GR per-
mits Malament-Hogarth spacetimes such that a relativistic computer can
be concretely implemented, and (ii) if so, whether any of these concrete
implementations are at all physically reasonable.
It turns out that there are many relativistic spacetimes which permit
the operation of relativistic computers. For instance, if one takes Minkowski
spacetime 〈R4, ηab〉, punches a hole in it, and conformally ‘blows up’ a com-
pact region around the punctuation, one obtains such a spacetime. As il-
lustrated in Figure 2, the metric field of the original Minkowski spacetime
is modified by a conformal factor Ω2, which is the identity outside of a
compact region C, but goes to infinity as event r, which is removed from
R4, is approached. The spacetime 〈R4 \ {r},Ω2ηab〉 is a Malament-Hogarth
spacetime because
∫
γ ds =∞ (and all other conditions are also satisfied).
Another example is anti-de Sitter spacetime, a Lorentzian analogue of
a hyperbolic space with constant negative scalar curvature. The most im-
portant family of Malament-Hogarth spacetimes for our present purposes,
however, are the Kerr-Newman spacetimes which describe rotating, charged
black holes. Such a black hole is classically defined by three parameters: the
black hole’s mass M , its angular momentum a, and its electric charge Q.
Kerr-Newman spacetimes are Malament-Hogarth spacetimes if they satisfy
the condition |a| + |Q| 6= 0. Kerr-Newman spacetimes include the special
cases of Kerr spacetimes, which describe vacuum spacetimes of uncharged,
rotating black holes (and are Malament-Hogarth spacetimes if |a| < M),
and of Reissner-Nordstro¨m spacetimes, which represent charged, but non-
rotating black holes. In what follows, we shall consider a Kerr-Newman
spacetime of a slowly rotating, slightly charged black hole.
The causal structure of a Kerr-Newman spacetime is given by its Pen-
rose diagram, as in Figure 3, with the timelike singularities indicated by
curly vertical lines. These diagrams capture the conformal structure of a
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Figure 2: The conformally ‘blown up’ Minkowski spacetime.
spacetime, which makes it straightforward to determine whether the rep-
resented spacetime is a Malament-Hogarth spacetime. As can be gleaned
from Figure 3, all the elements of a Malament-Hogarth spacetime and thus
of a relativistic computer are in place in a(n analytically extended) Kerr-
Newman spacetime.5 The proper length of the programmer’s worldline γp
is finite, while that of the computer γ is infinite, and all of γ lies in the
causal past J−(q) of q. As the figure illustrates, the programmer must dive
past the black hole’s horizon in order to have the entirety of γ in her past
and thus to reap the benefits of the relativistic computation. In fact, the
Malament-Hogarth event q lies on the inner horizon of the Kerr-Newman
black hole. All black holes possess an ‘outer’ event horizon, i.e., a hyper-
surface enveloping the spacetime region from which neither massive bodies
nor light can escape the gravitational pull of the black hole. Kerr-Newman
spacetimes also have ‘inner’ event horizons, due to the repelling effect of the
centrifugal force and occasionally of the electrostatic force. Such an inner
horizon forms if this repelling force overcomes the gravitational attraction
of the mass of the black hole and thus marks the hypersurface where both
forces counterbalance one another.
If the programmer thus finds herself in such a Kerr-Newman spacetime,
5For a more detailed treatment of Kerr-Newman spacetime in the context of relativistic
computation, cf. Ne´meti and Da´vid (2006, §2); for an accessible entry to the main ideas,
cf. Ne´meti and Andre´ka (2006). For systematic treatments of Kerr spacetimes in GR, cf.
O’Neill (1995) and Wiltshire et al. (2009).
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Figure 3: Penrose diagram of an analytically extended Kerr-Newman space-
time, with the worldline of a signal between computer and programmer
shown.
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she can take advantage of its Malament-Hogarth character and perform
a beyond-Turing computation. A question known to be non-Turing com-
putable is, for instance, the consistency of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with
the Axiom of Choice (ZFC), i.e., whether we can derive the formula FALSE
from the axioms of ZFC.6 The computer can thus check the consistency
of ZFC by checking propositions one by one—perhaps one a day—to see
whether they are theorems of ZFC. Obviously, if the computer finds that
some proposition φ and its negation ¬φ are both theorems of ZFC, and thus
finds a proof of the formula FALSE, then the inconsistency is established,
the question answered, and the computer sends a predetermined signal to
the programmer and halts. However, as long as the computer does not find
such an inconsistency, it continues checking and no signal is sent. Obviously,
this set-up assumes, quite unrealistically, that the computer never crashes,
is free of programming bugs, has access to an arbitrary large memory and
to an arbitrarily large amount of energy, and never encounters any other
obstacle to its proper functioning. Alas, none of this is true of the computer
on which this essay was written. However, these assumptions are consistent
with the laws of physics as best we currently know them and shall thus not
stall us in our considerations of matters of principle.7
Even though it is clear that the causal structure of a Kerr-Newman—
courtesy of the non-vanishing angular momentum and charge of the black
hole—permits the programmer to avoid collision with the singularity de-
picted in Figure 3 by the wavy lines, one might worry that the strong grav-
itational field of the black hole pose a health hazard to our programmer. In
particular, strong tidal forces may ‘spaghettify’8 the intrepid programmer.
However, as it turns out, these tidal forces become the smaller the bigger
the black hole is, making the plunge entirely safe for sufficiently large black
6Cf. Earman and Norton (1996, §12) and Welch (2008) for an assessment of the extent
of beyond-Turing computation in Malament-Hogarth spacetimes. Welch shows that al-
though there are upper bounds to what can be computed (under fairly mild assumptions),
effectively Borel statements can be resolved.
7Cf. Earman (1995, §4.8) and Ne´meti and Da´vid (2006, §5) for an assessment of these
potential obstacles. Cf. also the earlier Earman and Norton (1993), and the recent Man-
chak (2010). I concur with Manchak’s assessment that the physical reasonableness of
Malament-Hogarth spacetimes is yet to be settled. As to whether this means that a rel-
ativistic computer is physically reasonable, cf. Piccinini (2011, §4.2). Piccinini accepts
that relativistic computers are in principle possible (although computations in our Kerr-
Newman computer are not repeatable), but nevertheless concludes that “for now and the
foreseeable future, relativistic hypercomputers do not falsify [the physical Church-Turing
thesis].” (759) On the question of repeatability, cf. also Andre´ka et al. (2009, §5).
8This is a technical term describing the radial stretching and the tangential squeezing
acting on our traveller.
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holes.9
Having put these petty worries aside, the decisive question is how the
programmer can learn whether ZFC is consistent. If she received the com-
puter’s signal, then she will know that ZFC is inconsistent. If, on the other
hand, she reaches the MH event without having received a signal, then she
will know that ZFC is consistent. This means that she can only come to
know that ZFC is consistent if she can know when she passed the MH event
on her trip inside the black hole. This requires the programmer’s ability
to locate herself in the spacetime, e.g. by measuring the local gravitational
field. For the sake of argument, let us assume that she has the technological
know-how and equipment to perform any local experiment she desires and
that she is fully apprised of everything in her causal past.
Unfortunately, this is not strictly enough for her to determine her future,
including how long it will take her to traverse the horizon. Since the horizons
in relativistic spacetime are a matter of the global structure of spacetime,
they come without local, intrinsic, markers that would permit a traveller to
‘see’ the horizon as it is passed. In order for her to know when she passes the
MH event, therefore, the programmer needs to have sufficient information
about the global structure of the spacetime she inhabits. And the problem
is that as an inhabitant of the spacetime with no recourse to a ‘God-like’
external point of view she can never have complete knowledge of the global
structure of her spacetime. In fact, under rather mild assumptions, no
amount of observations an epistemic agent can have uniquely determines
the global structure of spacetime (Manchak 2009). This entails that not
only can the programmer never be certain that she in fact inhabits a Kerr-
Newman spacetime, but she can seemingly never determine the point of
passing the inner horizon and thus the MH event.
While the programmer cannot know that she in fact finds herself in a
spacetime appropriately Malament-Hogarth, let us assume that she in fact
does live in a Kerr-Newman spacetime such that all spacetime elements
requisite for our purposes are in fact present. She will still need to have the
means to determine whether she passed the MH event. One seemingly simple
way to do so would be to invoke the fact that as she passes the MH event,
she will no longer receive light signals from her home galaxy. The night sky
will, as it were, turn dark as she travels past the MH event q because all
worldlines of objects not diving into the outer horizon of the black hole are
confined to J−(q), as can easily be gleaned from Figure 3. Careful scrutiny,
9Cf. Wu¨thrich (1999, §3.4) for a precise calculation of the size of the tidal forces en-
countered by such a traveller.
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however, reveals that what appears to be an elegant solution to our problem
is in fact accompanied by a fatal effect: if the radiation emanating from any
source approaching the future timelike infinity of the spacetime ‘tile’ that
contains event p does not peter off at a sufficient rate, then the programmer
who receives this radiation in ever shorter intervals of her proper time will
be fried to death by the unbounded energy of the incoming radiation. This
is the so-called ‘blueshift problem’ noted in the literature before and treated,
for individual signal pulses from the computer but applicable to all sources
sending radiation towards the programmer, in Earman (1995, Lemma 4.2
and surrounding discussion) and Etesi and Ne´meti (2002, Proposition 6).
The only way for the radiation from her neck of the spacetime woods not to
kill her is for the emanated radiation to decrease sufficiently rapidly along
the worldlines of the sources.
One might think that the problem can be circumvented by letting the
computer send regular digest messages even if it did not yet derive the
formula FALSE. The rate at which the programmer receives these messages
would let her anticipate how far away from the MH event she still was. No
such messages would reach her after she passed the MH event, of course, and
she would thus know that ZFC was consistent. But for the reasons given by
Earman (1995, Lemma 4.2) and Etesi and Ne´meti (2002, Proposition 6), a
similar blueshift problem would arise in this case and the energy of the light
pulses would again roast our poor programmer. This was why we set up the
communication protocol between computer and programmer such that the
computer only sends a message if it derives the formula FALSE and none
otherwise. This makes sure that the signals from the computer do not bake
the programmer, but it does not help her determine whether she passed the
MH event.
Apart from the issues involving the communication between computer
and programmer addressed in §3, I consider the difficulty of the programmer
to determine her passage through the MH event the most serious obstacle
to an implementation of a relativistic computer in a Kerr-Newman space-
time. But since this is not the focus of the present paper, I assume that
she can somehow determine when she perambulates the inner horizon, per-
haps by applying her vast knowledge of astrophysics against the changing
character of the steadily incoming radiation she receives from her fainting
galactic homestead. With these assumptions in place, let us turn to the
communication protocol.
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3 Communication between a computer and its pro-
grammer
3.1 The photonic communication protocol
As we have seen, communication between the computer and the program-
mer is necessary for the implementation of a relativistic computer. As is
obvious from the causal structure of the Kerr-Newman spacetime, this com-
munication will necessarily be one-way from computer to programmer: the
programmer cannot send a signal to the computer once she passes the outer
horizon (cf. Figure 3). Because the programmer will then no longer be able
to send instructions to the computer and its operators, an agreed-upon pro-
tocol of communication is arranged prior to the programmer’s departure at
p. In the literature, if this is specified at all, this protocol is usually based
on coded photon signals. Unfortunately, this leads to various forms of the
blueshift problem. First, as was noted above, the number of photon pulses
sent must be limited lest the programmer be cooked to death. Thus, the
above protocol according to which only a message is sent if a contradiction
is found avoids this problem.
However, there is an additional difficulty. The later the computer sends
the signal, the shorter and higher-frequency the signal will be for the re-
ceiver. This will make the signal virtually impossible to be recognized or
even be detected. Using various ideas in Ne´meti and Da´vid (2006), one can
formulate three ways to solve the problem.10 First, in order for the frequen-
cies at the receiving end to remain bounded, the computer could correct for
the speed up by decreasing the frequency of the light for signals sent later.
Of course, one cannot produce readable signals of arbitrarily low frequency.
This impediment can be circumvented, Ne´meti and Da´vid (2006, 132) sug-
gest, by putting the computer on a spacecraft and send it away from the
black hole of the programmer, possibly drawn by another black hole. This
would effectuate a redshift in the emanated signal that could exactly coun-
terbalance the blueshift of the original situation. While I acknowledge that
this is in principle possible, this solution requires a potentially arbitrarily
large amount of energy to accelerate the spacecraft or another conveniently
located black hole that may not exist, as well as a perfect synchronization
of the whole procedure.
Another solution does not rely on arbitrarily large amounts of energy
10Ne´meti and Da´vid consider these ideas to solve distinct though related aspects of the
problem. I will somewhat carelessly run these together. For further ideas of how to solve
this problem, cf. Andre´ka et al. (2009, §4.1).
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Figure 4: The scenario involving a messenger travelling along γm from
the computer to the programmer (adapted from Ne´meti and Da´vid (2006,
Fig. 5).
or on such fine tuned features of the spacetime. Instead, the idea is to
send a messenger from the computer to the programmer if and once an
inconsistency of ZFC is found. The general scenario is illustrated in Figure
4. So suppose the computer does find an inconsistency at r and immediately
hands a letter to Magyar Posta, which takes off to deliver the message to the
programmer at s, long after the MH event at q. Thus, at s the programmer
will learn that ZFC is inconsistent. The trouble with this protocol is that if
the programmer has not received the letter, she will not know whether there
is no inconsistency and thus no letter under way or whether the mail simply
has not arrived yet. Thus, even if the Hungarian Post is capable of a fast
physical delivery of the letter, this is not an attractive protocol. A better one
would be for the mailman, whose spacecraft is roughly synchronized with
the programmer’s (for reasons given in Ne´meti and Da´vid (2006, §5.3.2)),
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to start signalling the programmer once he trespasses the inner horizon, as
indicated by the dashed lines in Figure 4. Although this is an improvement
vis-a`-vis the physical delivery at s, it is unclear how precisely this protocol
can be implemented and how the programmer can be certain of the answer
to the non-Turing computable question.
An altogether different solution, explicated in Ne´meti and Da´vid (2006,
§5.4.1), may, if successful, not just solve the present problem but also help
to stabilize the black hole against possible quantum evaporations: the com-
puter might ‘feed’ the black hole with matter and change the feeding pat-
terns or change the black hole’s angular momentum or its charge, in order to
signal to the programmer that it found an inconsistency. The trouble with
this proposal is that the acceleration of the universe needs to slow down
eventually for the computer to find sufficient material supplies to continue
the feeding of the black hole, for otherwise it may no longer have the means
to execute the change if and when it finds an inconsistency. Even if this is
so, however, the implementation of a protocol like this requires quite a bit
of precision engineering!
The challenges accompanying protocols of the above three types may be
altogether avoided if what promises to be a rather elegant solution trading on
non-local quantum correlations can be realized. In fact, Ne´meti and Da´vid
(2006) allude to the possibility of a protocol based on quantum non-locality:
It is an interesting future research possibility to solve the commu-
nication problem between γ and γp by some quantum-information
theoretic methods. (132)
This quote also shows that they do not take themselves to have fully met
the challenges involved with their three proposals. And it suggests a novel
vantage point to formulate a communication protocol: make use of the cor-
relations or anti-correlations between observed properties of entangled pairs
of particles. The remainder of this section is an attempt to deliver just
that: the outlines of a communication protocol based on non-local quantum
entanglement and to assess its prima facie feasibility.
3.2 A quantum-information-theoretic protocol to the res-
cue?
By way of preliminary remarks, let me explicate some background assump-
tions and remind the reader of the most salient features of quantum non-
locality. First, I shall make the idealizing assumption that the correlations
are perfect. Second, I will proceed as if it were unproblematically possible
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to create any number of entangled pairs of particles and to store them over
an indefinite time without disturbing their state so that their entanglement
persists. This is surely possible in principle, but hard in practice. Third,
these correlations between observable properties of two entangled particles
obtain non-locally, i.e., for spacelike separated measurement events. We will
have to revisit this point below. Fourth, this ‘quantum connection’ between
entangled particles is, in the words of Tim Maudlin (2002, Ch. 1), unatten-
uated, discriminating, and instantaneous—whatever that may mean in the
present context. It is unattenuated because in contrast to classical (instan-
taneous) action, the quantum connection is unaffected by distance—making
it an ideal tool for a computer of cosmic proportions. It is discriminating
in that unlike gravitational forces, which affect similarly situated objects
in the same manner, the quantum connection is a ‘private’, exclusive ar-
rangement between entangled particles. And it is instantaneous in that it
seems to propagate an influence from the one particle to the other without
delay—although that is a subtle point that needs to be finessed with care.
The first stab that I am aware of at importing quantum-information
theoretic protocols into the setting of Kerr-Newman spacetime was admin-
istered by Xian-Hui and You-Gen (2005). They investigate the possibility of
‘quantum teleportation’ in Kerr-Newman spacetime by letting one of the two
parties holding an entangled particle, ‘Alice’, hover over the event horizon
of the black hole, while the other, ‘Bob’, remains in the asymptotic region
from which Alice hailed.11 Quantum teleportation, first proposed by Ben-
nett et al. (1993), is a quantum-information theoretic procedure to transport
a quantum state in the absence of a quantum channel of communication, i.e.,
if only a classical channel is available.12 The point of the procedure is for
Bob to deliver an exact copy of his one-qubit state |ψ〉 to Alice. Since the
laws of quantum mechanics prevent Bob from determining the exact state
of the single qubit in his possession—if he makes e.g. a z-spin measurement
and finds UP, he cannot find out whether this was a certain outcome of the
system being in a z-spin eigenstate or merely a probabilistically determined
outcome of the system being in a superposition state—, he cannot simply
measure |ψ〉 and communicate it to Alice for her to obtain an exact copy.
In fact, even if he knew the precise state |ψ〉, communicating it would in
general take an infinite amount of classical information. So the task seems
prima facie impossible.
11In keeping with my earlier gender choices, I invert the nomenclature of Xian-Hui and
You-Gen (2005).
12Cf. Nielsen and Chuang (2000, §1.3.7) for an excellent recapitulation of quantum
teleportation.
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The amazing discovery of Bennett et al. (1993) was that a shared en-
tangled pair of particles permits the adoption of a protocol that solves the
problem. Adapted to the present context, Alice and Bob share an entangled
pair of particles before Alice travels toward the black hole, taking along her
entangled particle. In brief outline, Bob lets the qubit state interact with
his part of the entangled pair and then performs a measurement on both
qubits to obtain one of four classical outcomes (UP-UP, UP-DOWN, DOWN-
UP, DOWN-DOWN). He then sends a message communicating the outcome
of his measurement encoded in two classical bits to Alice via the classical
channel. Surprisingly, if Alice now performs an operation on her part of the
entangled pair depending on the message she receives, her qubit will now be
transformed into an exact replica of the original qubit |ψ〉 that Bob wished
to deliver to her!
Xian-Hui and You-Gen argue that one should expect a reduced fidelity
in quantum teleporting states if Alice approaches the event horizon of the
black hole, due to the Hawking effect. The Hawking effect is the surmised
semi-classical phenomenon of particle-antiparticle pair creation in the vac-
uum near the event horizon such that only one of the created particle escapes
the gravitational pull of the black hole to radiate into the asymptotic region,
while the other falls through the horizon. This effect leads to a thermal bath
of excited photons in the vicinity of the event horizon, disturbing the state of
Alice’s entangled particle in its cavity. The goal of their paper is to compute
how high the fidelity of quantum teleportation is in the proposed scenario,
using the resources of quantum field theory in curved background space-
time. Of course, this means that their considerations are at best first-order
approximations that may well fail in the presence of the strong gravitational
fields that our programmer may encounter. In spite of this limitation, their
results may indicate a near impossibility to maintain entanglement if one of
the particles is deployed to accompany the programmer through a journal
into a black hole. Fortunately, they find that the fidelity is high for slow,
massive black holes (as it is for extremal black holes), the situation we found
above to be the most conducive to the programmer’s survival.
In order to preserve the entanglement between the particles, it may also
be necessary to minimize Alice’s acceleration on her journey, as the amount
of entanglement seems to diminish for noninertial observers (Fuentes-Schuller
and Mann 2005). That may not be an obstacle to our plans, as unlike in
Xian-Hui and You-Gen (2005) Alice will not be brought near the event hori-
zon and then be accelerated away from the black hole to hover over the
horizon, but instead will dive through the event horizon, possibly in free
fall. Both the results of Xian-Hui and You-Gen (2005) and Fuentes-Schuller
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and Mann (2005) are semi-classical, and hence preliminary. Yet they hint at
subtle, but deep, connections between gravity and entanglement that remain
to be fully understood.
The attentive reader may have noticed why quantum teleportation of the
kind proposed in this recent literature will not solve the problems at hand:
the protocol of quantum teleportation still requires a classical communica-
tion channel. But if the computer and our programmer could communicate
classically once the computer has found an inconsistency in ZFC, then the
whole point of the present discussion of quantum-information-theoretic ways
to circumvent the need for such communication would be moot! Quantum
teleportation would help if the task were to transmit large amounts of in-
formation from computer to programmer, but not if it is to faithfully com-
municate a simple YES or NO. So the question before us is whether there is
a way for the computer to communicate with the programmer without any
‘channel’. After all, at least in principle, we only need to transmit one bit
of information!
The simple idea, then, would be to implement the following protocol.
Both programmer and computer each obtain one particle of an entangled
pair. The programmer then departs on her journey and the computer starts
its task of checking whether ZFC is consistent. If and once the computer finds
an inconsistency, then it performs a measurement or some local operation
on its part of the entangled system. As long as it does not find an incon-
sistency, the computer leaves its particle undisturbed. The question now
is whether the programmer inside the outer horizon of the Kerr-Newman
black hole could somehow find out using only her entangled particle that
a measurement has been made on the entangled counterpart held by the
computer on the home planet.
3.3 The limits of entanglement-based signalling
The trouble with this simple quantum-information-theoretic protocol is that
it seems to run afoul of a central theorem in quantum mechanics prohibiting
‘signalling’. This theorem rules out the possibility of a ‘Bell telephone’, i.e.,
a way of using entangled pairs of particles in spacelike-related regions to
instantaneously transfer information from one region to the other in what
would constitute superluminal signalling and hence an apparent violation
of special relativity. As this theorem gives the conditions under which en-
tanglement cannot be used for signalling, we need to make sure that our
protocol does not inadvertently satisfy these conditions. Roughly stated,
the theorem asserts there can be no superluminal information transmission
17
(‘signalling’) between spacelike-related regions even if they share an entan-
gled pair of quantum systems.
This theorem, or some variant of it, is usually thought to protect the
integrity of relativity in the face of non-local Bell correlations. You might
think that these variants of the theorem, which are all stated in terms of
spacelike relations between the regions of the parts of the entangled system,
do not concern the present problem, which, to repeat, is to try and use
entanglement to signal between timelike- or null-related events. We cannot,
however, easily evade the strictures of these results because they do not
seem to make any assumption concerning the spatiotemporal separation of
the subsystems.
While there are different versions of the theorem, the following are typical
premises of their proofs. First, it is assumed that the particles held by Alice
and by Bob don’t interact and hence that the Hilbert space of the total
system is a tensor product state
H = HA ⊗HB,
where HA and HB are the Hilbert spaces of Alice’s and of Bob’s particle,
respectively. Second, the state of the composite system is given by a density
operator on H, i.e., ρ = ∑iAi ⊗ Bi, where Ai and Bi are operators on
HA and HB, respectively, which need not be states on the subsystems. A
state ρ that is not separable, i.e. cannot be expressed as ρ =
∑
i piρ
i
A ⊗ ρiB,
where the ρiX are density operators on HX and pi ≥ 0, is called entangled.
Third, it is assumed that Alice and Bob can only operate locally on their
particle. Thus, the operators corresponding to the local operations that e.g.
Alice can perform on her particle are of the form O = OA ⊗ IB, where OA
is some operator defined on HA and IB is the identity operator on HB,
and mutatis mutandis for Bob. It should be noted that nothing in these
assumptions places specific demands on how the subsystems A and B are
spatiotemporally related.
Without going into the details,13 one can then derive that the statistics
of measurement outcomes in one wing do not change under local operations
in the other wing. Thus, whatever Bob does to his particle, Alice has no
way of detecting Bob’s local operation in her particle. In fact, she cannot
even detect whether he did anything at all.
It must be noted that in this argument, nothing regarding the measure-
ment events’ relation in time (or space) is assumed; instead, it is assumed
13Cf. Peres and Terno (2004, §2.E) for a more rigorous statement of the results and a
commented list of references for the specific results.
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that the local operations on a subsystem do not change the state of the other,
distant subsystem. Although different variants of the no-signalling theorem
differ over details, it is thus no surprise that several authors have com-
plained that these results are relevantly circular.14 In one way or another,
they presuppose what they are supposed to establish, viz. that entangled
states cannot be used to signal between what is normally assumed to be
spacelike-related regions. From this it does of course not follow that such
signalling is possible, let alone easy; it merely follows that it has not been
shown to be impossible. While they thus fail to outlaw signalling, they show
how special-relativistic constraints can be consistently implemented in the
formalism of quantum mechanics.
However, since the impossibility of superluminal signalling between space-
like-related regions can be well justified on the basis of special relativity, the
assumed conditions stated in the premises of the no-signalling results ar-
guably obtain. But the same justification does not apply to situations in
which the regions are timelike- rather than spacelike-related, for there is of
course no relativistic reason why signalling could not occur between these
regions. Thus, ‘timelike signalling’, as it may be called, will arguably not
face the same restrictions as the spacelike case.
If it is the case that entanglement can be ‘used’ for signalling in all and
only in situations in which we could have signalled ordinarily,15 then my
suggestion is of course moot, as either we could have signalled anyway or else
cannot use entanglement to do so. But the issue relevant for my project is
whether the antecedent holds, which I take to be an open question. It seems
as if in our case, ordinary signalling is not possible, and yet entanglement-
based communication may be. Thus, as far as the foundations of physics
are concerned, my proposal effectively rises the non-trivial and important
question of the extent of the no-signalling prohibitions in quantum theory.
All these no-signalling results, whatever their merits, are results in or-
dinary, i.e. non-relativistic, quantum mechanics augmented by the premises
of these theorems, which are not axioms of ordinary quantum mechanics.
Whatever else may be the case, ordinary quantum mechanics will surely
not be true in strong gravitational fields. So let’s move our attention to
quantum field theory on curved spacetime as a first step towards a quantum
theory of gravity combining quantum effects with strong gravitational fields.
In fact, if we do that, there are—perhaps unsurprisingly—some indications
that spacelike and timelike separations indeed differ relevantly.
14Cf. Kennedy (1995), Peacock and Hepburn (2000), and Peacock (2009).
15As was asserted by a referee.
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Figure 5: Axiom 1 asserts that the algebra of the (purple) spacetime com-
plement O′ of a (cyan) region O is a subalgebra of the commutant of the
algebra of O.
In axiomatic quantum field theory, the locality of operations is built
into the axioms of ‘microcausality’ or ‘locality’, which assume that, roughly,
operators predicated of spacelike-separated regions commute. Thus, in ax-
iomatic quantum field theory, a ‘local action’ principle is usually observed,
where ‘local action’ means something like ‘no physical action can propagate
faster then the speed of light’. This can be articulated more rigorously in
different ways. For instance, ‘Locality’ in the Haag-Kastler axioms means
that algebras ‘living’ is spacelike separated regions commute, as follows:
Axiom 1 (Haag-Kastler Locality). Given an algebra A(O) of operators
defined over a spacetime region O ⊂ M, with O′ ⊂ M denoting the set of
spacetime points spacelike separated from every point in O and A′ the set of
operators that commute with every operator in A (the ‘commutant’ of A),
then
A(O′) ⊆ A(O)′.
In other words, operators of observables in spacelike-separated regions
are among those that commute with one another. But notice what the ax-
iom does not stipulate: that timelike-separated operators must commute.
In fact, in general they will not, and so it is at least not prohibited that
there can be entanglement-based timelike signalling. We should surely not
consider the no-signalling theorems of standard quantum mechanics no-go
theorems for a purely entanglement-based communication protocol between
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computer and programmer, even if they succeeded to be that for the space-
like case. However, it is also clear that such a protocol is currently no
more than a mere possibility; we need a concrete protocol and a concrete
understanding of how this would work.16
Furthermore, it should be noted that it has recently been shown that
at least for massless quantum fields in the Minkowski vacuum state there
also exists field entanglement between timelike-separated regions of space-
time (Olson and Ralph 2011). In fact, Olson and Ralph (2012, §V) even
speculate about a quantum teleportation protocol based on such timelike
entanglement! Just as in the spacelike case above, however, their proposed
protocol also relies on a classical communication channel and thus does not
help our programmer. What clearly follows from my argument, though,
is that whether there can be timelike signalling may be a more important
question than we previously thought.
So while quantum field theory seems quite hospitable to the general pos-
sibility of timelike signalling, it turns out that on some interpretations of
non-relativistic quantum mechanics, superluminal, i.e. spacelike, signalling
is permitted.17 This would be possible just in case the value of some local
observable controllable by Bob would influence the statistics of Alice’s mea-
surement outcomes. At least for a large class of theories, Berkovitz (2008,
§7.1) argues that the following two conditions are individually necessary and
jointly sufficient for superluminal signalling:
1. “Controllable probabilistic dependence. The probabilities of dis-
tant measurement outcomes depend on some nearby controllable phys-
ical quantity.
2. “λ-distribution. There can be in theory an ensemble of particle
pairs the states of which deviate from the quantum-equilibrium distri-
bution; where the quantum-equilibrium distribution of pairs’ states is
16One might worry at this point, as did a referee, that the usual conceptualization
of entanglement between states in algebraic QFT required that their algebras commute
and hence that the notion of timelike entanglement is meaningless for non-commuting
algebras in timelike-separated spacetime regions, or—worse—that such entanglement may
not exist. I cannot easily allay this concern, but only remark that if the concept of
entanglement presupposes that the algebras predicated of the respective spacetime regions
commute, then it would be a conceptual truth that entanglement cannot be used for
signalling between these regions, quite regardless of how they are causally related. It is
clear that this could not be justified on the basis of special-relativistic prohibitions of
superluminal signalling alone. In what follows, I will simply assume—perhaps against
better advice—that the possibility of entanglement-based ‘timelike signalling’ remains
open.
17Cf. the excellent survey in Berkovitz 2008, particularly §7.
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the distribution that reproduces the predictions of orthodox quantum
mechanics.”
Since we are only looking to establish the possibility of timelike signalling,
I take it that these two conditions would be jointly sufficient, though not
individually necessary.
There exist both non-collapse as well as collapse interpretation of ordi-
nary quantum mechanics that permit superluminal signalling.18 First, there
is Bohmian mechanics, which involves parameter independence and there-
fore controllable probabilistic dependence. If quantum statistics is regarded
not as lawlike, but only as contingently true, then there may be perhaps
atypical worlds in which λ-distribution holds. So possibly, Bohmian me-
chanics permits superluminal signalling. Similarly, the two conditions may
obtain in some collapse theories, such as e.g. the so-called ‘non-linear con-
tinuous stochastic localization models’, if we can very finely control some
degrees of freedom.19 Note that in this case, the statistics would be different
from orthodox quantum mechanics and we would thus have two empirically
inequivalent theories.
Finally, Aharonov et al. (2004) proposed a signalling protocol based on
the idea of ‘protective measurements’ which supposedly permit the extrac-
tion of information from an entangled state without ‘disturbing’ it.20
In sum, many specific questions remain open, and will remain so until a
successful quantum theory of gravity is available. But I submit that we have
hitherto at least no conclusive reason to assume that quantum entanglement
cannot be used for the timelike communication between the computer and
the programmer behind the outer event horizon and perhaps even beyond
the inner horizon. If it can be so used, it would be clear that it we would
sacrifice certainty: whatever local manipulations would be performed on the
computer’s particle would at best alter the statistics of the measurement
outcomes at the programmer’s end. This has two consequences. First, the
programmer would need to make multiple measurements on an ensemble
of entangled particles to obtain a statistical distribution of measurement
outcomes. Second, even then, only statistical confidence, but not certainty
can be achieved: if the programmer performs many measurements on her
particles and obtains an outcome statistics that deceptively resembles, say,
the statistics we would expect if no manipulations were performed on the
other end, then she will falsely come to believe that the computer did not
18Cf. §7.2 and §7.3 of Berkovitz 2008, respectively.
19Cf. Butterfield et al. (1993).
20Cf. also Peacock (2009).
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derive the formula FALSE and that ZFC is thus consistent.
The general outline of this protocol, then, would be as follows. Before the
programmer leaves the computer behind to embark on her dive into the black
hole, they prepare a large ensemble of entangled pairs of particles which are
then individually sealed into insulating cavities. The programmer and the
earthbound operator of the computer agree on a certain local operation to
be performed on all particles in the terrestrial ensemble if and once the
computer finds an inconsistency of ZFC. So the programmer knows what
statistics of outcomes to expect depending on whether or not such local
operations have been executed. The programmer then departs for the black
hole with her ensemble of particles. If and only if the computer finds an
inconsistency will it manipulate its particles according to the agreed upon
plan. Assuming that the programmer can determine her point of entry
into the inner horizon and thus knows when she passes the MH event, she
can then perform the pertinent measurements on her particles to find the
resulting statistical distribution of measurement outcomes. If she does her
statistics right, she can then infer, with some statistical confidence, whether
or not the computer manipulated its particles and thus whether or not ZFC
is consistent.
4 Conclusion
A fair assessment of the prospects of an in-principle possible communica-
tion protocol between the computer and its programmer based on shared
quantum entanglement requires a resolution of a number of issues at the
very forefront of understanding quantum physics and its workings in a grav-
itational context. Ultimately, of course, we will need a quantum theory of
gravity to accurately describe how quantum systems and strong gravita-
tional fields interact. Only then will it be possible to close the now wide
open case of how to implement a relativistic computer—or should we say a
relativistic quantum computer—if that is at all physically possible. Strictly
speaking, we already need to take into account quantum effects already for
the purely photonic protocol: photons are quantum systems, and to con-
sider worldlines of classical test particles which travel at the speed of light
amounts to a bet that this will yield ‘sufficiently true’ results, for which
there is of course no guarantee.
The central lesson, I take it, is that studying the physical Church-Turing
thesis not only ties computational questions concerning the Church-Turing
thesis with foundational issues in general relativity, such as the stability of
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horizons and the cosmic censorship hypothesis, but also connects with foun-
dational problems in quantum physics, and hence with quantum gravity. In
this sense, the physical Church-Turing thesis thus finds itself at the inter-
section of the mathematical foundations of computation, of the foundations
of general relativity and cosmology, and of quantum physics. Furthermore,
any penetrating analysis of relativistic computers turns on a delicate nego-
tiation between multiple levels of theoretical considerations, e.g. concerning
their consistency with axioms of a theory, their consonance with physical
intuitions, and how insights from distinct theories ought to be combined.
Anyway, as things currently stand, I concur with the cautiously opti-
mistic tone of Ne´meti and Da´vid (2006), Ne´meti and Andre´ka (2006), and
Andre´ka, Ne´meti, and Ne´meti (2009) and conclude that the chances of such
a device being at least in principle physically possible are intact. So is hy-
percomputation physically realizable? Well, I don’t know. But we should
be grateful to Istva´n who has been so instrumental in opening up this area
for fruitful research.
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